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DEBATE 
MEDICARE:  DID THE DEVIL MAKE US DO IT? 
In this lively and creative debate, Professors David Hyman and  Jill 
Horwitz argue about the virtues and vices of the federal Medicare 
program.  As some predict a bleak future for the American’s govern-
ment’s ability (or inability) to continue paying for Medicare as the 
population ages, this debate shows that there is genuine disagreement 
about the severity of the problem. 
In his Opening Statement, Professor Hyman offers a satirical letter 
to the Devil from one of his demonic servants, describes the Medicare 
program through the lens of the seven deadly sins.  Arguing that 
Medicare’s faults are represented in each sin, the servant promises 
that Medicare is on track to “destabilize the virtue of the American 
republic.”    Hyman’s fictional minion predicts that, unless the federal 
government enforces “fiscal discipline” on the program, the Medicare 
program will “implode within two generations.”  Hyman advocates for 
a market-based solution, believing that “[i]f people spending their 
own money don’t want what the Medicare program is offering, we are 
by definition spending more on health care than we should, and, in 
doing so, we are undermining the fiscal integrity of the nation as a 
whole.”  He writes, “[o]nly the Devil could come up with something 
that fiendishly clever.” 
Professor Horwitz responds by arguing that some of Medicare’s 
supposed vices to be not as sinful as Hyman presents them and that 
“there may be some virtue buried in that program design.”  While she 
agrees that the Medicare system as it exists today is flawed, she count-
ers that Hyman’s “preferred design, one more oriented to the market, 
would generate plenty of its own injustice.”  Horwitz ultimately argues 
for a smarter, more effective Medicare program, one that applies “the 
many tools that we have in our toolbox” and would involve a “more 
comprehensive implementation than we’ve had before.”  These 
changes and modifications should aim to towards “controlling spend-
ing and improving quality,” but Horwitz also urges caution in making 
those changes, as  any step will have reverberations that will be felt 
everywhere.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Medicare:  Did the Devil Make Us Do It? 
David A. Hyman
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, I was invited to a conference celebrating the 40th anni-
versary of Medicare—the federal program that provides health insur-
ance to approximately forty-two million (primarily elderly) Americans.  
At the conference, I presented an article satirizing the excesses and 
dysfunctions of Medicare.  See David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephi-
stopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003).  The article takes the 
form of a memo from a junior bureaucrat in the Department of Ill-
ness and Satanic Services (“DISS”) to the Devil, reporting on the pro-
gress of their plans to create a program (Medicare) that incorporates 
all seven of the deadly sins and undermines the distinctively American 
virtues of thrift and truth-telling. 
The paper was subsequently expanded into a book, Medicare Meets 
Mephistopheles (2006).  Professor Jill Horwitz wrote a lengthy review of 
the book, which appears in the Michigan Law Review.  See Jill R. Hor-
witz, The Virtues of Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (2008).  The edi-
tors of PENNumbra have graciously agreed to provide a forum for au-
thor and critic to engage directly with one another. 
This initial installment summarizes the central themes of the 
book.  Professor Horwitz will then summarize her review.  I will re-
spond, and then Professor Horwitz will have the last word. 
With that out of the way, on with the satire: 
 
1
Richard & Marie Corman Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University 
of Illinois. 
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MEMORANDUM 
To:       His Most Exalted Satanic Majesty 
7th Circle of Hell, Hell 
 
From:   Underling Demon 666 
Deputy Assistant Special Coordinator for 
Accelerating Recruitment (“DASCAR”) 
Department of Illness and Satanic Services 
(“DISS”) 
 
Re:        Market Share Report—United States of America 
 
Per your request, I report herein on the progress of our attempts 
to corrupt the American republic.  Happily, our market share in the 
United States grows with every day that passes.  Our growth has been 
particularly precipitous since we repackaged our product in 1965. 
As you know, the recipe we have used for centuries (avarice, glut-
tony, envy, sloth, lust, anger, and vanity—known hereinafter collec-
tively as the “Seven Deadly Sins”) has always worked perfectly well in 
most of the known world.  Unfortunately, Americans proved curiously 
resistant to the charms of the Seven Deadly Sins.  Through almost two 
centuries, Americans persisted in doing unto others as they would 
have done unto to themselves, working hard and playing by the rules, 
staying in school, saving for a rainy day, going to church, donating to 
charities, volunteering their time to worthy causes, and generally be-
having like goody-two-shoes at every conceivable occasion.  Although 
we have long had considerable success with our recruiting efforts 
among certain groups of Americans (i.e. members of Congress and 
lawyers), these groups were unable to do serious damage as long as 
the rest of the population behaved itself. 
As such, it was a stroke of evil genius for your eminence to come 
up with the idea of creating a governmental program that would cor-
rupt everything and everyone it touched.  See SATAN, DESTABILIZING 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC WITH A GOVERNMENT-MANDATED INTER-
GENERATIONAL PYRAMID SCHEME (Brimstoneware Press 1964).  The 
program works insidiously, so that the citizenry do not perceive its 
consequences until it is far too late.  Indeed, they vigorously defend 
the program against all criticisms, and, ironically enough, believe the 
program’s critics are allied with us! 
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I refer, of course, to the Medicare program, whose every feature 
bears the distinctive stamp of your subtle genius.  This memo reviews 
each of the seven deadly sins and details the ways in which the Medi-
care program incorporates and reinforces each sin.  It then outlines 
how the Medicare program allows us to undermine the distinctively 
American virtues of thrift and truth-telling.  Finally, it outlines the risk 
of exorcism, which has the potential to undo our demonic plans. 
I. THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF MEDICARE 
A. Avarice 
Avarice primarily affects the 1.3 million providers who deliver 
goods and services to Medicare beneficiaries.  Medicare has resulted 
in an artesian well of money for these providers—but the whole point 
of avarice is that more than most is never quite enough.  Providers ac-
cordingly agitate ceaselessly for increases in Medicare payments–-and 
as a concentrated special interest, they have had considerable success 
in extracting ever-increasing sums from the federal fisc.  Consistent 
with our larger goals, Medicare’s compensation arrangements pay 
providers based on their inputs (procedures performed or time spent) 
and not their outputs (high quality care actually delivered), creating 
predictable results on the quality and cost of care actually delivered. 
B. Gluttony 
Gluttony primarily affects Medicare beneficiaries.  At the outset of 
the Medicare program, the costs of care (both per beneficiary and to-
tal) were relatively modest, and beneficiaries were responsible for a 
substantial percentage of the cost of care.  The politics of Medicare 
created a one-way ratchet, shifting the distribution of costs toward 
those paying for the Medicare program (i.e. the working population) 
and away from Medicare beneficiaries.  Because the working popula-
tion is, as a group, less well off than those on Medicare, our efforts 
have resulted in a reverse-Robin Hood health care scheme, which robs 
from the (working) poor and gives to the middle and upper classes. 
C. Envy 
Because Medicare’s payment system is heavily influenced by local 
costs of production, and total payments are similarly affected by local 
treatment patterns, the cost to the Medicare program (and hence the 
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amount of resources spent per beneficiary) varies greatly among the 
several states, as well as within those states.  One group of commenta-
tors has estimated that we could buy each and every Medicare benefi-
ciary in Florida who agreed to receive their health care in Minnesota a 
new fully-loaded Lexus GS400 and the Medicare program would still 
come out ahead.  See John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher, & Jonathan S. 
Skinner, Geography and the Debate Over Medicare Reform, HEALTH  
AFF. W96, W96-W97, Feb. 13, 2002, available at http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1.pdf. 
These geographically-based disparities, and the envy they have 
triggered, precipitated a “formula fight” among the several states, 
complete with litigation and coalitions of aggrieved states and senior 
citizens.  We are particularly lucky that the Senate Finance Committee 
is disproportionately composed of Senators from low-cost states, who 
are extremely aggrieved that the Medicare money train does not 
unload their “fair share” of Medicare money in their jurisdictions. 
D. Sloth 
Sloth primarily affects program administrators.  Program adminis-
trators care a lot about cost, a bit less about access, and, at least his-
torically, not at all about quality.  This is no accident; indeed, the fun-
damental structure of Medicare was designed at every turn to reflect 
these priorities.  Any provider who meets the (limited) entry require-
ments is entitled to participate in Medicare, and patients are free to 
choose any provider who will have them–-meaning that program ad-
ministrators have little or no ability to keep out of the program pro-
viders whose quality they are unimpressed with or to reward providers 
whose quality is exemplary. 
E. Lust 
The Medicare program induces lust for program expansion 
among Democrats.  Although we periodically tantalize Democrats with 
proposals to add the “near-elderly” to Medicare, we adhere to your 
original plan to resist program expansion at all costs.  As you correctly 
perceived many years ago, allowing everyone into Medicare will im-
mediately bankrupt the program, as the cross-subsidies which sustain 
Medicare are only achievable if there are sufficient marks outside the 
program to pay the necessary funds into the program.  Medicare’s 
beneficiaries understand this point perfectly well; the demise of Presi-
dent Clinton’s Health Security Act was inevitable once it became clear 
it would “take” from the elderly and “give” to the uninsured. 
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Medicare also provides Democrats with the tools to satisfy their 
lust for power.  Of course, the lust for power is innate in all politicians 
and political parties.  However, Democrats disproportionately empha-
size Medicare in their appeals to the electorate, and have used the 
program as a bludgeon against their Republican adversaries at every 
conceivable turn, regardless of the actual magnitude of differences 
between the parties, the bipartisanship of the effort, and the financial 
straits in which the Medicare program finds itself. 
F. Anger 
Medicare triggers anger among Republicans.  Democrats have 
successfully positioned themselves as the protectors of the Medicare 
program and of program beneficiaries.  The Republicans cannot 
“outbid” the Democrats on Medicare without busting the budget, and 
their efforts to revise the financing of Medicare and its delivery op-
tions are routinely and effectively demagogued. 
Not surprisingly, Republicans are angry about the effectiveness 
with which a large command and control program, that is inexorably 
gobbling up an ever-increasing share of federal tax revenues, has be-
come a sacrosanct feature of American politics.  The madder they get, 
the less credible their efforts to escape the box in which your emi-
nence has placed them. 
I also note that the debate over the 2003 Medicare prescription 
drug benefit caused the parties to switch sins, at least temporarily.  
Republicans’ lust for political power caused them to vote for a dra-
matic expansion of Medicare, even though doing so was flatly incon-
sistent with their long-standing concerns about the fiscal integrity of 
the program and its impact on the budget.  Similarly, the design of 
the prescription drug benefit and their inability to claim credit for 
program expansion made Democrats so angry they asserted that 
G.O.P. stood for “Getting Old People.”  See Hyman, supra, at 64 (quot-
ing Ed Markey, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Medicare Rx Debate (PBS tele-
vision broadcast June 27, 2003) (transcript available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june03/medicare_06-
27.html)). 
G. Vanity 
Normally, policy analysts are stereotypical “goo-goos,” insisting on 
the dotting of every “I” and the crossing of every “T” before they will 
allow government money to be spent on anything.  Yet, in Medicare, 
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the same analysts have bestowed their enthusiasm on a program that 
systematically and routinely pays (and frequently over-pays!) for the 
mistreatment of the vulnerable Americans left in its charge.  Your ef-
forts have led them to reason sub silentio that a program offering a rot-
ten benefits package, mediocre quality health care, and run-away costs 
is better than no program at all. 
 
II. UNDERMINING AMERICAN VIRTUES 
A program incorporating the seven deadly sins would never attain 
its intended objectives unless we simultaneously undermined the two 
American virtues that would otherwise impede our efforts:  thrift and 
truth-telling. 
A. Thrift 
As you know, Medicare’s financing is structured so that current 
beneficiaries are paid with funds secured from current taxpayers-–
frequently referred to as “pay as you go.”  Demographic trends and 
the ever-increasing cost of health care ensure that the program’s eco-
nomics are simply unsustainable–-a fact that was clear even before the 
prescription drug benefit made things worse, when it was added in 
2003.  The extent to which Medicare, with its “promise now, pay later” 
approach has succeeded in undermining thrift is exemplified by the 
comments of the U.S. Comptroller General, who described Medicare 
on 60 Minutes as a “fiscal cancer.” 60 Minutes:  U.S. Heading For Finan-
cial Trouble? (CBS television broadcast July 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/01/60minutes/main2528
226.shtml. 
To summarize, we are lucky that no one has (so far) “connected 
the dots” of the fundamental features of Medicare: 
1. Short-term viability dependent on continuous addition of 
new participants/funds; 
2. Unsustainable long-term promises; 
3. Early “investors” paid off with subsequent “investor” con-
tributions; 
4. Arguments from security/fidelity/solidarity to ensure con-
tinued participation. 
Once these dots are connected, it is clear that Medicare is of a 
piece with one of your most successful initiatives—the pyramid 
460 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 453 
PENNumbra 
scheme—this time structured on an inter-generational basis.  Pyramid 
schemes are invariably shut down as soon as they are discovered, on 
the grounds that those who were suckered at the outset have no right 
to share their misery with others.  Pyramid scheme organizers are also 
treated harshly by the legal system, on the grounds that defrauding 
hundreds or thousands of people is much worse than defrauding a 
handful of people.  Indeed, were anyone other than the United States 
government running the Medicare program, those responsible would 
already be serving long prison terms for fraud.  However, you cleverly 
positioned Medicare as a sacred inter-generational trust, suggesting 
rhetorically that the pyramid scheme must be maintained, if not ex-
panded, at every conceivable occasion. 
Despite our repeated efforts to disguise the truth about Medicare 
through the endless repetition of misleading rhetoric (principally the 
phrase “trust fund”), many Americans are coming to realize that 
Medicare is, in fact, an elaborate inter-generational pyramid scheme.  
Indeed, no less a “New Democrat” authority than The New Republic has 
been forced to observe, “if there’s a big problem with Medicare these 
days, it’s the program’s lack of long-term financial viability.”  See 
Hyman, supra, at 81 (quoting Jonathan Cohn, The Single Guy, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 2002, ¶ 12).  Thankfully, our framing of the Medi-
care program as a sacred inter-generational trust has significantly 
dampened the outrage that would otherwise result; the New Republic 
would not have been nearly as complacent had the sentence been “if 
there’s a big problem with Enron these days, it’s the company’s lack of 
long-term financial viability”-–although the principal difference be-
tween the two arrangements is that Medicare’s “lack of long-term fi-
nancial viability” is much worse than Enron’s. 
B. Truth-Telling 
As you predicted, entitlement programs have provided numerous 
opportunities for political dissembling.  The ceaseless use of mislead-
ing terminology, such as trust fund, is one aspect of the phenomenon.  
This terminology is used to suggest that Medicare contributions are 
being saved, even though the money that comes in is spent as soon as 
it is received, or it is loaned to the Treasury in exchange for a com-
mitment binding on future taxpayers. 
Yet, the full effects of Medicare on political truth-telling are best 
manifested by the whoppers politicians will tell to justify their attempts 
to save the program from self-destruction, or to extract political ad-
vantage from the “reform” proposals of their opponents.  Both Repub-
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licans and Democrats know they are unelectable if they speak candidly 
about the economic problems facing Medicare.  The Republicans ac-
cordingly package their reform proposals as attempts to “modernize” 
the Medicare benefit package, and offer beneficiaries more options.  
The Democrats focus their efforts on price caps and prayer.  Neither 
approach is likely to lead to the minimum expected of a private insur-
ance plan or investment-–actuarially and economically sustainable 
promises to purchasers/investors. 
III. THREATS TO THE DEMONIC PLOT 
Our strategy has been so successful that there is only a limited 
prospect of exorcism.  The most concrete threats are proposals to fully 
means test Medicare or convert it into a defined contribution plan.  
Other risks include the outright repeal of Medicare Part D and Medi-
care’s increasing enthusiasm for leveraging its purchasing power to 
enhance quality and lower cost.  Any of these reforms will fragment 
the coalition of support that currently sustains the inter-generational 
pyramid scheme we have created and nurtured. 
IV. SUMMARY 
All of the building blocks are in place for our plans to destabilize 
the virtue of the American republic.  The Medicare budget is heading 
for a brick wall at an accelerating rate.  Every attempt to impose fiscal 
discipline triggers squeals of outrage from affected providers, benefi-
ciary groups, and true believers in the inter-generational pyramid 
scheme you have created. 
Our best calculation is that the Medicare program will completely 
implode within two generations-–and efforts to “reform” Medicare will 
extend the process only slightly, while simultaneously breeding dissen-
sion and class warfare–-precisely the objectives outlined in your origi-
nal memo. 
Have a hellish day. 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, Medicare is not a demonic plot, and it is libelous to 
suggest so (or would be, if one could libel a government program).  
However, satire provides a tool with which to explore some of Medi-
care’s problems in a less confrontational way than might otherwise be 
the case.  At least that’s my story, and I’m sticking to it. 
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Despite the claims of its defenders, Medicare is not a sacred bond 
between the generations.  It is just another government program–-and 
a pretty mediocre one at that. 
The first rule of holes is simple:  when you find yourself in one, 
stop digging.  Medicare Meets Mephistopheles is a satirical attempt to pro-
voke Medicare’s defenders and the American public to acknowledge 
that we are in a hole and that we should stop digging.   
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REBUTTAL 
Medicare and the Cardinal Virtues 
Jill R. Horwitz
†
 
As Professor Hyman mentioned in his Opening Statement, our 
first PENNumbra exchange summarizes much longer works—
Professor Hyman’s recent book and my review in the Michigan Law 
Review. See Jill R. Horwitz, The Virtues of Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1001 (2008).For those with the fortitude to engage the details—and 
one of my main points in this Rebuttal is that in toting up the vices 
and virtues of Medicare, the details matter—I urge readers to consult 
the longer works. 
Despite rumors to the contrary, Professor Hyman does not work in 
the Devil’s employ.  He really wants to make the health care system 
better and, in doing so, to make us all healthier and happier; he 
thinks the best way to do it is to eliminate the Devil’s handiwork—big 
government.  I confess that the idea of relying on the market to pro-
vide health care has theoretical appeal.  We mainly rely on the market 
to provide goods that are just as, if not more, important than health 
care.  We may regulate the provision of food and housing quite exten-
sively, but we manage to get them to millions of people through pretty 
well-functioning markets and without anything like all the kerfuffle 
about health care.  Newspapers and scholarly journals are not filled 
with endless streams of articles bemoaning the growth of spending on 
either.  So why not just get rid of all this unnecessary bureaucracy? 
It turns out that conducting an exorcism isn’t so easy.  If you are 
looking for evidence of a demonic presence here on Earth you need 
to look in a place far less obvious than a government program; you 
need to look deeper, into the very nature of health care.  Who else but 
the Devil would create illness so rampant, medical treatment so com-
plex, knowledge so limited, and the need for such fast decision-
making?  This is why health care markets are filled with failure, and 
the government, mostly, isn’t to blame. 
That is not to say that Professor Hyman’s assessment of Medi-
care—that it spends too much, for the wrong reasons, on second-rate 
stuff, and from the pockets of the poor—–entirely misses its mark.  
 
†
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research 
Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Medicare is enormous, and it’s growing fast. (Though whether its 
growth is unsustainable is an open question.)  We ought to do a better 
job at considering its distributional consequences.  A closer look at 
Professor Hyman’s complaints reveals that maybe Medicare isn’t as 
sinful as he suggests.  In fact, there may be some virtue buried in that 
program design. 
I. MEDICARE’S VICES ACCORDING TO HYMAN 
A. Avarice 
Medicare is vast.  It covers approximately forty-four million people 
and spends over $370 billion dollars every year.  (And, by the way, 
Medicaid spends almost just as much.)  Pretty soon even these dollars 
might come to look like pocket change.  Some analysts predict that by 
2050, Medicare spending alone will increase to 9.2% of GDP from 
2.6% in 2005, both because of growth in the cost of medicine and the 
graying of America.  See David M. Cutler, The Potential for Cost Savings 
in Medicare’s Future, HEALTH AFF. W5-R77, W5-R78, Sept. 26, 2005, 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5. 
r77v1.  It’s even worse than that.  If you are looking for a culprit for 
total spending, you can blame Medicare for inducing more private 
spending on health care as well as public spending.  See Amy Finkel-
stein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance:  Evidence from the Introduc-
tion of Medicare 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11619, 2005). 
Evidence of spending, however, isn’t evidence of avarice.  Most 
health care providers aren’t stealing money.  They are being paid for 
providing medical care.  Why should we care how much money we 
spend on health care anyway?  Per capita health spending varies con-
siderably (more than 100 to 1) across nations.  See William D. 
Savedoff, What Should a Country Spend On Health Care?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 
962, 962 (2007).  Ironically, spending on medical care is lower in 
countries with public systems than with private systems.  See David M. 
Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECO-
NOMICS 2143, 2168 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 2002).  
People have to spend their money on something.  The percentage of 
GDP spent on health care can be understood as a matter of national 
choice, not whether the country can afford the bill.  Many people ar-
gue that the U.S. has made the right choice in spending on health 
care because it has meant that we are living longer and healthier lives.  
See Michael E. Chernew et al., Increased Spending on Health Care: How 
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Much Can the United States Afford?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 15 (2003).  Some 
have even argued that over time we ought to be spending even more 
than we are today.  See Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of 
Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 122 Q.J. ECON. 39, 40 (2007).  So 
spending per se isn’t a problem.  It is a problem, however, if it means 
that we have to give up too many other goods that matter for our qual-
ity of life.  If more spending on health care means less education for 
children then that’s a problem.  But if it means a little less violent en-
tertainment, that might be evidence not of a sin, but of a virtue—
prudence. 
A harder question than whether we are spending too much on 
health care is whether we are spending efficiently.  Inefficiency ex-
plains some, although not all, of why U.S. health spending is higher 
than health spending elsewhere.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that 
we should spend less even though it does mean that we should spend 
smarter.  This is because variations in spending patterns are so com-
plex—-additional spending in some regions is worth it and in others is 
not—-you don’t improve the efficiency of Medicare spending by sim-
ply refusing to buy the next dollar of health care. 
B. Gluttony 
“Underling Demon 666” is perhaps proudest of Medicare’s ability 
to tempt people into spending more of their money–-and even more 
delicious, other people’s money—on health care than they would ab-
sent insurance.  Medicare’s supposed Gluttony refers to two distinct 
problems that are critical to disentangle:  (1) moral hazard and (2) 
inequitable distribution. 
Moral hazard is an inevitable cost of insurance.  It occurs when an 
individual is less careful than usual or consumes more than she oth-
erwise would because she doesn’t have to pay all the costs of an acci-
dent or her consumption.  Although people may not be less careful 
with their bodies just because they have insurance, they do go to the 
doctor more.  Professor Hyman thinks that Medicare has turned its 
patients into diners who take an extra trip to the all-you-can-eat buffet.  
They are plenty full and wouldn’t order another course if they had to 
pay for it, but, because they don’t, they pile the food on their plates. 
No doubt some people buy an extra course of care that they don’t 
need just because Medicare picks up the tab.  Yet the analogy is 
stretched.  People generally become patients because they are sick, 
not because they are insured.  Medicine isn’t like food; it doesn’t usu-
ally taste good.  And unlike estimating the cost of an additional serv-
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ing of dessert, measuring moral hazard in the health care context is 
notoriously hard.  Doing it the usual way—looking at what people 
would consume absent insurance and deciding the rest is moral haz-
ard—isn’t accurate.  People mostly consume more medical care when 
they are insured because they can’t afford it otherwise.  They may very 
well value it at much more than its cost.  So, yes, health insurance in-
duces many patients to get the surgery, but this is often the virtue of 
insurance, not its vice. 
C. Gluttony II 
One of Professor Hyman’s biggest concerns is that Medicare is a 
reverse–Robin Hood scheme.  Because of its reliance on payroll taxes, 
it takes from the young and the working poor and gives to the retired 
wealthy.  Here the Devil is in the details.  Let’s consider a few different 
questions about the way Medicare redistributes. 
(1) Does Medicare transfer money from workers who are young to 
retirees who are old?  Yes, it’s supposed to.  Elderly retirees need 
health insurance more than younger workers because, on average, 
they get sick more.  Besides, young people turn into old people; 
they’ll not only have their turn to be beneficiaries—they’ll be quite 
happy to find that they are consuming something much better:  to-
morrow’s medicine. 
Professor Hyman worries that the young won’t ever get their turn 
because Medicare is a pyramid scheme that is going to come crashing 
down.  This is debatable.  Whether transfers will grow depends on how 
medicine changes and how much it will cost.  For example, we don’t 
know whether genomic developments will make medicine more or 
less expensive and efficient.  Further, demographics are not destiny.  
Whether Medicare, like other large social insurance programs, is sus-
tainable depends on economic growth.  Historically, each successive 
generation is more productive than the last.  Even so, forecasting fifty 
years and more into the future is a perilous business.  Neither pessi-
mism nor optimism is justified. 
Regardless, restructuring Medicare to avoid these explicit inter-
generational transfers will not necessarily help.  Absent Medicare, eld-
erly people would find some way to get care and cost-shifting would 
abound, whether they would go onto Medicaid, to emergency rooms, 
or to their children for financial help.  Younger people, particularly 
taxpayers, will pay one way or another. 
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(2) Does Medicare transfer monetary value from the poor to the 
rich?  It depends on how you count.  The rich live longer so they are 
both more likely to 1) live long enough to get Medicare and 2) enjoy 
its benefits for more years.  But they also pay more taxes than the 
poor.  So the evidence on monetary transfers is mixed.  See, e.g., Jay 
Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J. 
PUB. ECON. 277, 278 (2006) (finding evidence of transfers from the 
rich to the poor). 
(3) Is Medicare inequitable among the old?  That is, do the rich 
beneficiaries get more out of the program than do the poor benefici-
aries?  Probably—but the poor show net gains too, and the gap is 
shrinking.  See Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of 
Medicare, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 257, 258 (2006); Jonathan Skinner & Weip-
ing Zhou, The Measurement and Evolution of Health Inequality:  Evidence 
from the U.S. Medicare Population 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10842, 2004). 
(4) How do rich compare to poor beneficiaries in terms of health 
outcomes?  Again, everyone benefits, but the poor probably do better.  
See Skinner & Zhou, supra, at 2. 
So, yes, there is evidence of inequitable redistribution.  But what 
should we do with this fact?  I think that we should strive for temper-
ance.  Why?  Because I doubt those poor patients want to give up 
those life years they gained from the program just because someone 
else got a better deal. 
D. Envy 
Unfortunately, it’s still too early in the analysis to start dancing on 
the Devil’s grave.  Professor Hyman is right to bemoan what can only 
be described as shocking geographic variation in patterns of hospital 
use, surgery, and medical spending.  One look at a map of medical 
treatment patterns is enough to make patients very queasy. 
Medicare’s design, however, is only one of plenty of explanations 
for this variation, many of which have to do with the nature of health 
care and the scale of social insurance programs.  Incentive systems 
can’t be perfect.  Information is hard to disseminate.  Monitoring is 
costly.  Medical science is an uncertain business. 
Further, we don’t know whether private alternatives would do any 
better than Medicare at solving these problems.  There are no neat 
case control studies with relevant control groups because almost all 
the elderly are covered by Medicare.  There are plenty of studies 
comparing various experiments within Medicare, but none that would 
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allow anyone to conclude that elderly patients would spend less or get 
higher quality care without it.  Perhaps Americans are practicing tem-
perance by not embracing the free market. 
II. MEDICARE’S VIRTUES 
A. Wisdom 
Rather than continuing to address each vice and urge readers to 
look a little deeper before despairing about Medicare, I’d like to shift 
the focus of the discussion to how we should measure whether Medicare 
has been a success or a failure.  Health and monetary benefits are im-
portant, but they aren’t the only things that matter.  What about Medi-
care’s value as an insurance program, one meant to reduce the risk of 
high out-of-pocket spending on health care when it is needed?  What 
are the net insurance benefits for the elderly?  For the poor?  For the 
rich?  In other words, how valuable is Medicare insurance in terms of 
risk protection to the elderly, many of whom were uninsured before 
the program was started? 
Before Medicare was enacted, many poor people were uninsured 
or underinsured.  Medicare provided risk protection to people who 
were previously unable to get it.  So it’s important to identify what 
Medicare provided in terms of insurance value to its beneficiaries and 
to identify “the differential insurance value between high and low in-
come households . . . .”  McClellan & Skinner, supra, at 258.  From this 
perspective, the results look pretty good.  Beneficiaries at every level 
of income show net gains from having access to the insurance pro-
vided by Medicare and the poor show bigger gains than the rich.  Id. 
at 270. 
B. Fortitude and Justice 
Even if Hyman is right about all this, we are left with the question 
of what to do?  Should we let the entirety of Medicare burn in Hell?  
Since massive social programs are inevitably flawed, how should we 
balance the various injustices?  Hyman focuses on Medicare’s financ-
ing, oversight, and political problems.  Yet his preferred design, one 
more oriented to the market, would generate plenty of its own injus-
tice.  Why is that better? 
It is too much to ask of anyone, even the Devil, to provide the di-
agnosis and the treatment for Medicare in a single rebuttal.  So I hope 
we’ll get there in the next round. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Cooling Out the Marks, Medicare Style:  Balancing  
Demonic Vices and Cardinal Virtues 
David A. Hyman 
I appreciate Professor Horwitz’s willingness to review my satiric 
book on Medicare, as well as the care and good humor with which she 
undertook the task.  That she was willing to do so when she was pre-
tenure and had countless better things to do leaves me doubly in her 
debt.  Finally, she has added to my debt by her willingness to partici-
pate in this online exchange. 
I particularly appreciate Professor Horwitz’s opening stipulation 
that “[d]espite rumors to the contrary, Professor Hyman does not 
work in the Devil’s employ.”  Although I winced a bit at “rumors to the 
contrary,” this is still considerable progress from a conference early in 
my career, when a senior colleague in health law asserted that “mine 
[were] the sort of views that caused the Irish potato famine.”  David A. 
Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium:  A Self-Help Guide for The Per-
plexed, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 & n.43 (2000).  In all fairness, Pro-
fessor Horwitz’s formulation does not exclude the possibility that I am 
an independent contractor working for the Devil—but that is the sort 
of smart-mouthed observation that only a wiseacre former tax lawyer 
(i.e. me) would make. 
Let me begin with a half-dozen of the numerous areas of agree-
ment between author and critic: 
1. We agree that details matter, and readers should consult 
the longer works to get the full flavor of both the book 
and the review. 
2. We agree that Medicare is enormous, growing fast, and its 
distributional and economic consequences should be 
more closely considered than has previously been the 
case. 
3. We agree that health care markets are complex and that 
government is not to blame for all the deficiencies in their 
performance. 
4. We agree that Medicare is buying lots of care whose qual-
ity leaves much to be desired—in part because of perverse 
incentives, such as paying the same amount (if not more) 
for low quality care than for high quality care. 
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5. We agree that there are “virtues buried in the Medicare 
program” and that I slight them.  (To be sure, to complain 
that a satirical polemic is not “fair and balanced” is to miss 
the point of the genre.  More broadly, despite Professor 
Horwitz’s title, the virtues she identifies are neither the 
“cardinal virtues” of prudence, temperance, fortitude and 
justice, nor the theological virtues of faith, hope, and char-
ity—although Medicare does considerably better when 
judged by the latter (hope) than the former (prudence).  
(It is unclear why two Jews have any business debating 
Catholic doctrine.  Blame Professor Horwitz.  She started 
it.)) 
6. We agree that Medicare succeeded in providing universal 
coverage to a population that the private market was not 
covering.  Doing so required hundreds of billions of dol-
lars per year—which we agree that Medicare is spending 
inefficiently, while not doing much to purchase popula-
tion health. 
Lest the reader think that there is universal agreement, where do au-
thor and critic disagree? 
First, we disagree on whether Medicare is sustainable in anything 
like its current form.  Professor Horwitz says that this is an “open ques-
tion” that is “debatable.”  She doesn’t have much company in that po-
sition.  Every year, Medicare’s public trustees issue a report politely 
noting that the current trends are unsustainable and reporting the 
number of years until the Part A “trust fund” is exhausted.  The latest 
report, issued last month, includes the second consecutive “Medicare 
funding warning” and calls for “timely and effective action to address 
Medicare’s financial challenges . . . [including] the exhaustion of the 
HI trust fund and the anticipated rapid growth in HI, SMI Part B, and 
SMI Part D expenditures.”  2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trus-
tees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary 
Medical Insurance Trust Funds 4, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2008.pdf.  As I noted in my original 
submission, the U.S. Comptroller General was less polite, referring to 
Medicare as a “fiscal cancer.”  He also described the recently enacted 
prescription drug benefit as “probably the most fiscally irresponsible 
piece of legislation since the 1960s”—i.e. since the date when Medi-
care was created.  60 Minutes:  U.S. Heading For Financial Trouble? (CBS 
television broadcast July 8, 2007), available at http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/01/60minutes/main2528226. 
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shtml.  He has since quit his job as Comptroller General, and is work-
ing full-time on a “fiscal wake-up tour” that focuses on the federal 
budgetary implications of entitlement programs like Medicare.  Rea-
sonable people can disagree on whether the program’s unfunded li-
abilities are exactly $36 trillion, as estimated by Medicare’s trustees to 
cover the next seventy-five years (or $85 trillion for an indefinite time 
horizon), but one needs a stronger argument than that it is “an open 
question” to dispute the bipartisan agreement on the fiscal and budg-
etary fix we find ourselves in.  See Joseph Antos, Medicare’s Bad News: Is 
Anyone Listening?, AEI HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for 
Pub. Pol’y, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2008, at 3, available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.,pubID.27825/pub_detail.asp. 
We also disagree on the extent to which health care spending and 
moral hazard are serious problems.  Professor Horwitz states that 
overall spending can’t be a problem unless it keeps us from buying 
things we really need, and moral hazard can’t be that big a problem, 
because no one voluntarily chooses to consume health care.  Space 
precludes a full response, but a simple thought experiment makes the 
point.  If we offered program beneficiaries the cash value of the risk-
adjusted premium necessary for them to purchase coverage compara-
ble to Medicare, how many would buy back into the program?  I bet 
relatively few would opt for the open-ended, no-expense spared, “ma-
chine that goes ping” (referring to the classic Monty Python sketch) 
coverage that Medicare provides.  See THE MEANING OF LIFE (Univer-
sal Pictures, 1983).  Most would use the savings (if not the entire 
amount) for non-medical purposes. 
What about those currently paying into the system—would they 
continue to participate if they could opt out?  Professor Horwitz must 
believe that they will, since her sunny prediction is that “they’ll not 
only have their turn to be beneficiaries, they’ll be quite happy to find 
that they are consuming something much better:  tomorrow’s medi-
cine.”  This position is implausible on its face.  Medicare is a manda-
tory government program precisely because it is a negative-sum game 
for everyone other than those who get in early and those who provide 
services to program beneficiaries.  More bluntly, Medicare only 
“works” because of forced contributions from “marks” outside the sys-
tem. 
If people spending their own money don’t want what the Medi-
care program is offering, we are by definition spending more on 
health care than we should, and, in doing so, we are undermining the 
fiscal integrity of the nation as a whole.  The satiric thesis of my book 
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is that only the Devil could come up with something that fiendishly 
clever. 
We also disagree on the extent to which we should be concerned 
about Medicare’s distributional implications.  Professor Horwitz ar-
gues that Medicare beneficiaries are all better off as a result of the 
program.  However, this argument misses the point—one does not 
judge the merits of a pyramid scheme by looking at the amounts re-
ceived by those lucky enough to cash out early.  As I said previously, 
the essence of Medicare is that it robs from the (working) poor and 
lower middle class (who are disproportionately uninsured) in order to 
pay for insurance for the middle and upper classes.  One might de-
fend this arrangement (with some degree of embarrassment) on the 
grounds that everyone will get their fair share eventually, but if the 
projections about Medicare are even remotely close to right, that just 
isn’t going to happen.  It is for this reason that virtually all employers 
(including the state of Michigan, where Professor Horwitz works) have 
abandoned defined benefit retirement plans (which Medicare is 
modeled on) and adopted defined contribution plans. 
Although Professor Horwitz agrees with me that there are numer-
ous deficiencies with the Medicare program, she argues that compre-
hensive market-oriented reform is inappropriate since a market-based 
system will “generate plenty of its own injustice.”  No system is perfect, 
but the strategies outlined in my book (including means testing, pay-
ing beneficiaries a risk-adjusted defined contribution, repeal of Medi-
care Part D, greater competition, and prudent purchasing) are more 
likely to focus our resources on those who need it the most, and do so 
in a more affordable and sustainable fashion than the status quo.  
What’s so demonic about that? 
To highlight the challenges created by Medicare, and give Profes-
sor Horwitz a broader target at which to shoot, let me offer a satirical 
job posting for the next program administrator: 
Wanted:  Medicare Administrator 
Salary:  Not nearly enough, given what you have to put up with. 
Top Ten Tasks: 
1. Spend less on health care (to keep Congress and the Ad-
ministration from calling for your head); 
2. Spend more on health care to avert the 7% cut in physi-
cian payments scheduled to take effect next year (to keep 
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providers from calling for your head, and patients from 
doing so once they can’t find a doctor to treat them); 
3. Improve the quality of care that is delivered by using ap-
propriate carrots and sticks—but don’t interfere with the 
way in which providers deliver health care, particularly if 
the provider delivering low quality care has the ear of a 
Congressman or employs lots of people in a swing district; 
4. Buy lots of pharmaceuticals for seniors, but don’t pay too 
much (or Congress and the Administration will have your 
head) or too little (or the pharmaceutical companies will 
stop developing innovative products); 
5. Using inadequate and dated information, set the price 
that will be paid by Medicare for every single good and 
service beneficiaries need in every county in the United 
States; 
6. Prepare the program for the impending tidal wave of baby 
boomers, who will stop paying into the system and start 
expecting benefits in 2011; 
7. Keep a straight face while you explain that the Medicare 
program will be there for future generations, even though 
your trustees have determined that putting one part of the 
program in actuarial balance for the next seventy-five 
years will require an “immediate 122-percent increase in 
the tax rate or an immediate 51-percent reduction in ex-
penditures.” 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees 
of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supple-
mentary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 19, http:// 
www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2008.
pdf; 
8. Keep your temper when called before Congress to explain 
why the Medicare program keeps gobbling up the federal 
budget, when it was Congress that set the program on 
auto-pilot to do exactly that; 
9. Save up money to live abroad once you retire, because 
your life won’t be worth a plugged nickel once those who 
have paid into Medicare for their entire lives realize it 
won’t be there for them—and also realize that those ad-
ministering the program knew that all along; 
10. Walk on water in your (non-existent) free time. 
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Finally, my reply is titled “cooling out the marks, Medicare style.”  
This is a reference to a well-known article by a famous sociologist, on 
con games and the social process of adaptation to failure: 
 Sometimes, however, a mark is not quite prepared to accept his loss 
as a gain in experience and to say and do nothing about his venture.  He 
may feel moved to complain to the police or to chase after the operators.  
In the terminology of the trade, the mark may squawk, beef, or come 
through.  From the operators’ point of view, this kind of behavior is bad 
for business.  It gives the members of the mob a bad reputation with 
such police as have not yet been fixed and with marks who have not yet 
been taken.  In order to avoid this adverse publicity, an additional phase 
is sometimes added at the end of the play.  It is called cooling the mark 
out.  After the blowoff has occurred, one of the operators stays with the 
mark and makes an effort to keep the anger of the mark within manage-
able and sensible proportions.  The operator stays behind his team-mates 
in the capacity of what might be called a cooler and exercises upon the 
mark the art of consolation.  An attempt is made to define the situation 
for the mark in a way that makes it easy for him to accept the inevitable 
and quietly go home. The mark is given instruction in the philosophy of 
taking a loss. 
Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out:  Some Aspects of Adaptation to 
Failure, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451, 451-52 (1952). 
The occupational hazard for Medicare’s defenders is the tendency 
to become coolers on the program’s behalf.  Professor Horwitz largely 
avoids this temptation, although she is not (yet) willing to concede 
how hot things actually are in the place in which we find ourselves.  
The same cannot be said for Medicare’s more ardent defenders, who 
routinely justify and excuse Medicare’s pathologies on the grounds 
that it is a “sacred inter-generational trust,” and not just another me-
diocre government program.  Yet, even these ardent defenders may 
eventually find themselves wondering, in the dark of night, how it 
came to pass that they became coolers, giving instruction to the poor 
and working classes on the philosophy of taking a loss at the hands of 
a program that was supposed to help them, but ended up treating 
them as marks.  With friends like that, who needs enemies? 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Medicare for Mortals 
Jill Horwitz 
Last month Medicare’s Board of Trustees released their 2008 An-
nual Report in which they predicted Medicare spending over the next 
seventy-five years.  As Professor Hyman points out, that the report in-
cludes yet another Medicare funding warning is cause for concern.  
The CBO estimates of the long-term outlook are even worse. 
But let’s think for a moment about what health care looked like 
seventy-five years ago.  In 1933, scientists were experimenting with 
penicillin but it wasn’t mass produced until 1944.  The Nobel Prize in 
Medicine was given to Dr. Thomas Hunt Morgan for discovering the 
role that the chromosome played in heredity.  Congress weighed in 
on whether to require that vitamins be put into lipstick.  People were 
just beginning to buy health insurance.  Participants at the 1933 AMA 
convention were urged to embrace eugenics as the hope for the coun-
try. 
What were they predicting about the future of medicine seventy-
five years ago?  Eminent surgeons from around the world were told 
that 
[t]he medical man of the future . . . would “tune in” on the living body 
as one does now on the ordinary radio. . . . Long before there was any 
outward evidence of disease, the physician-radio-engineer of the future 
would thus be enabled to tell by the “reception” of the “life-waves” 
whether they were playing a melody of health or whether they were sig-
naling an SOS. 
William L. Laurence, Crile Advances Life Ray Theory as Medical Basis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1933, at 1.  In 1933, the editor of the Journal of the 
American Medical Association decried both the introduction of group 
medical practices and the growth of the hospital because “from 85 to 
90 percent of [inpatient] cases could be treated by a general practi-
tioner with equipment that ‘can be carried in a handbag.’”  Assails Re-
port on Medical Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1933, at 31.  That same year, 
attendees at a Harvard Medical School lecture were told that medicine 
had inappropriately disregarded the health of the elderly.  Urges 
United Drive to Extend Longevity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1933, at 14.  Who 
counted as the elderly?  People over 50. 
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We shouldn’t mock these people for their erroneous predictions.  
These prognosticators were well-educated, informed, and at the top of 
their professions.  But they were enough degrees off that we find their 
guesses amusing in hindsight.  Why do we think we can do any better 
at making predictions about what will happen in 2083?  We don’t 
know how shifts in research from anatomy to biochemistry will change 
medicine, never mind how much they will cost.  They may save us 
money; they may not.  Given all this uncertainty, it is not surprising 
that historical projections of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund’s in-
solvency date have varied so much. 
Now pile political uncertainty onto technological and financial 
uncertainty.  Despite years of predictions of Medicare’s imminent de-
mise, it’s never happened.  Why?  Congress has never let it happen.  
Congress can, and does, change the program.  It isn’t bound to cur-
rent federal policy, and it isn’t going to let federal health care spend-
ing consume more than one-hundred percent of GDP, a prediction of 
some current models.  Congress can limit benefits, restructure the 
program, or raise taxes.  And perhaps raising taxes to cover some high 
level of care is the right answer.  As I’ve noted in our previous ex-
changes, some economists have convincingly argued that previous 
spending hasn’t been profligate but, rather, shows good investment 
sense—we have gotten more than our money’s worth from health care 
spending.  If this is right, we shouldn’t be blinded by our worries 
about costs—we should be thinking, at least as much, about spending 
more efficiently. 
Regardless, whether Medicare is sustainable over the long term is 
not likely a question that we can answer with much precision.  It’s also 
why Professor Hyman’s Doomsday prediction that there will be no 
gruel left for us after today’s elderly are done gorging themselves on 
high-tech medicine is nothing but speculation—and less supported 
speculation than what he calls my “sunny prediction” that tomorrow’s 
medicine is going to be better than today’s.  Would you prefer blood-
letting or a Tylenol for your headache? 
Fortunately the question about whether the current edifice of 
Medicare can stand over the long term is not the most important.  We 
should instead focus on a series of interconnected questions that we 
might be able to answer.  How much health care do we want?  What 
are we willing to spend on it and, therefore, what are we willing to give 
up in terms of consumption of other goods?  How can we make sure 
we are buying the good stuff and not the bad stuff?  How can we fairly, 
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responsibly, and accurately quantify the answers?  How do we imple-
ment reforms while avoiding perverse incentives? 
First—and here is something that Professor Hyman and I agree 
on—we should strive to provide care that people want and not provide 
care that they don’t.  What’s the best way to determine what people 
want?  Professor Hyman wants to offer future beneficiaries the (risk-
adjusted) cash value of the coverage a beneficiary receives and ask 
whether they want to use it to buy Medicare coverage.  He claims that 
they wouldn’t and then concludes that this is evidence that people 
think Medicare is a sham—an albatross people would chuck if given a 
chance. 
But this thought experiment misses the point of insurance.  Insur-
ance isn’t meant to buy a predictable package of predetermined 
goods—it is supposed to protect people from the big, unpredictable 
hits.  Ask people whether they would spend the cost of their premium 
to get the benefit of insurance if they end up with a catastrophic ill-
ness, even if their probability of getting some awful disease is low.  Ask 
them if they’d like to face the choice of paying grandpa’s hospital bills 
for some life-saving treatment or junior’s college tuition.  I bet that 
question would generate a different answer about the value of Medi-
care insurance than the one Professor Hyman would ask. 
This brings us to a second, deeper point of disagreement:  the 
role of moral hazard in health care consumption.  Moral hazard is the 
ugly cousin of insurance.  People will consume more when others are 
paying, and insurance is a way of making other people pay.  Professor 
Hyman says that I think moral hazard can’t be a big problem in health 
care consumption because it isn’t pleasant to take medicine.  My point 
wasn’t that there is no moral hazard in health care.  There almost cer-
tainly is.  My response was meant to emphasize that it is very hard to 
tell how much moral hazard there is, where it is, and what to do about 
it.  The risks of intervening and getting it wrong are high. 
Imagine the following two insurance plans that cover eyeglass 
purchases.  Plan 1 allows you one new pair per year and Plan 2 allows 
you two new pairs per year.  I bet that more people under Plan 2 will 
get two pairs per year than those under Plan 1.  Maybe a few of those 
people under Plan 2 buy two pairs because their prescription changed 
and they would have bought the two pairs even if they were insured 
under Plan 1.  The rest are getting the second pair because someone 
else is paying, not because the insurance allows them to access impor-
tant care that improves their health or because getting the second pair 
helps the rest of us (like a vaccine).  The structure of Plan 2 looks 
wasteful, and comparing the dollar value of eyeglass purchases under 
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each plan is a pretty good way to quantify the waste.  This, however, is 
a trivially easy case.  Imagine the scenario of covering open heart sur-
gery (which, by the way, attracts few casual participants). 
The difficulty in examining the extent of moral hazard in the 
health insurance context is that having health insurance lets people 
get more care than they otherwise would and that additional care may 
be 1) wasteful, or 2) protective of the rest of us, or 3) good for the pa-
tient and worth the cost, or 4) some combination of these.  Simply ob-
serving that people get more care when they are insured than when 
they aren’t insured doesn’t get you very far in figuring out how much 
moral hazard exists in health insurance or what to do about it. 
Professor Hyman understands all this and thinks the free market 
can save us.  This view of the private sector is puzzling.  We have a pri-
vate sector and, on average, it isn’t doing any better in containing 
costs or cost growth than the public sector.  Why?  In large part be-
cause medical technology is growing, and lots of what that technology 
does, although not all, is to help us live longer and healthier lives. 
As Professor Hyman notes, we agree that one way to get at the 
problem of high costs might be to do a better job on providing higher 
quality care.  (I say “might” because providing higher quality care is 
not always cost-saving.)  We need to figure out how to promote and 
pay for the good stuff and avoid the bad stuff.  Fortunately, there is a 
lot that we can do that we aren’t doing as suggested by the extreme 
geographic variation in medical spending, variation that implies wide-
spread inefficiency.  We are currently buying medicine that doesn’t 
help and may even hurt people.  Good estimates suggest that such 
spending accounts for around one-third of total health care spending.  
We need to figure out what we’re doing wrong, and stop:  not only to 
save enormous amounts of money, but also to save lives. 
But, again, I suggest that Professor Hyman overlooks the complex-
ity of the problem and, therefore, the difficulty of finding the right so-
lution.  Patients aren’t great consumers.  They have a hard time telling 
whether the medicine they received helped, hurt, or did nothing.  
Even researchers can’t yet identify good, neutral, or bad spending.  
We can’t rely only on health policy researchers pursuing their own in-
terests to give us the answers.  At a minimum, we need the kind of sys-
tematic, coordinated analysis that is best produced through targeted, 
government funding.  See John E. Wennberg et al., Extending the P4P 
Agenda, Part 2: How Medicare Can Reduce Waste and Improve the Care of the 
Chronically Ill, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1575 (2007). 
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Understanding these complexities sheds some light on why em-
bracing the market in the extreme through individual health savings 
accounts—one of the reforms that Professor Hyman hints at endors-
ing—would likely be harmful.  Most people just want to get help from 
the medical system when they need it, and they don’t want to have to 
understand all kinds of things about risk and probability to get their 
entry ticket.  They don’t know how much a plan should cost, which 
plan to pick, or what their expected probability of illness will be over 
the years.  Think about how difficult it is to pick a plan for those of us 
who are lucky enough to have a few insurance choices.  Just this year I 
gave a talk to my faculty on health insurance and used the University 
of Michigan benefits plan as an illustration.  In preparation I read the 
charts that summarize the plan options, but found the terms hard to 
compare.  So I did a lot of digging and read a few eighty-page contract 
“summaries.”  I couldn’t ever figure out how to get the (no doubt) 
thousands of pages of underlying contracts that the university had ne-
gotiated on my behalf.  Let’s just say the search and decision costs are 
high. 
Recent advances in economics have taught us that having more 
choices is not necessarily good.  In the health insurance context, more 
choice has often meant more adverse selection, a problem that is at 
least as big for health insurance markets as is moral hazard.  In addi-
tion, when people face complicated information and difficult choices, 
they often make bad choices.  They tend to be too sensitive to upfront 
costs relative to long term gains (subprime mortgages, anyone?).  Pa-
tients tend to stop taking drugs when the price goes up a little even 
when the long term value of the drug is enormous.  Looking at an-
other experiment in individual purchasing gives some guidance.  With 
the growth of individual retirement accounts, average savings has 
gone up but so has variance.  If you care at all about equality, this is a 
big deal. 
So far in this debate I have mainly focused on the ways in which 
Professor Hyman’s reasoning has been over-simplified and his pro-
posals likely to lead to negative unintended consequences.  But, of 
course, even if we knew how much moral hazard there is, which 
spending is wasteful, and who is gaming the system, that still wouldn’t 
suffice. 
We need to both deal with costs and cost growth.  And we need to 
deal with the distinct issue of dangerous and inefficient spending.  We 
should, however, do so carefully, using the right kind of incentives.  So 
at the time we continue to investigate, we should apply the many tools 
that we have in our toolbox, market based and otherwise.  These in-
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clude information technology (for example, computerized physician 
order entry), pay for performance, disease management, medical pro-
tocols, preventive care, chronic care management, care coordination, 
and more.  We’ve tried some of these approaches here and there, in 
certain regions, in pilot programs, and in small trials.  That’s not 
enough.  We need more comprehensive implementation than we’ve 
had before, because piecemeal action won’t cut it.  If you squeeze the 
balloon in one place, it will bulge in another.  This is one of many rea-
sons why major reforms to huge payer programs like Medicare and 
Medicaid offer a unique opportunity for safety and for cost control.  
Helping Medicare take a step in the right direction towards control-
ling spending and improving quality will have reverberations that will 
be felt everywhere.  Let’s tread carefully. 
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